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Abstract
In economies with limited communication between agents thete emerge natural
(eocial) organization structures. We focus our attention to one auch a etructure,
called a network. lt turna out that these networks usually exist in a deterministic
graph-theoretic setting. They can be interpreted as potential or latent organization
structures, of which one eventually will emerge.
Previously the existence of such networks or la.tent organization structures was
already established for "normal" economies, i.e., economies with a finite number
of agents or a continuum of agents. This paper is concerned with the question
whether in pathological economies with limited communication there also exist such
potential organization structures. In this paper we state and prove some generic
results concerning this existence problem.
1
1 Introduction
The problem of limited communication between economic subjecta has received
increasing attention in the past few years. The reason is that the ezisting literature
on general equilibrium theory does not allow for constraints on communication
between economic agents in the allocation or trade processes. Therefore, one is
neither able to describe coalition formation in a realistic way.
Itecently, this issue has been addressed frum several points of view. Consid-
ering the problem of coalition formation, firstly, one may put direct constraints in
coalition formation. This is done in Hammond, Kaneko and Woodere (1987) and
in Gilles (1987). The first paper describes a core in a continuum economy based
on blocking by finite coalitions only. The second is giving a descriptioa of coali-
tion formation based on a certain limited collection of primitive coalitione. Both
however only give an intuitive justification for their approach, and to the queation
whether these axioms concerning coalition formation are valid.
Another point of view is to give a direct description of communication in an
economic setting. A very basic approach is given in Aumann and Drèze (1974), who
developed the notion of a coalition structure consisting of disjoint groups of agents
without direct communication between those groups. This concept has led Myerson
(1977) to introduce a graph to describe commuhication in a game or an economy
directly. It turned out to be a very fruitful tool for deacribing such limited commu-
nication situations, but it also had severe limitationa with respect to the techniques
that had to be used in solving certain problems in such environments. Traditionally
one has "skipped" this problem by introducíng and using stochastic graphs instead
of deterministic graphs in the description oí communication situations.
ln more recent literature, the development of these stochastic graph-theoretic
models of communication has been extended beyond the notion of a coalition struc-
ture. Allen (1982) used a stochastic model to study the spreading of innovations
in an economy with limited communication. Kirman, Oddou and Weber (1986)
based a model of coalition formation on a graph-theoretic model oï communication.
They defended the application of stochastics in their model by noting that "it is
difficult to envisage that the modeler should be able to specify the communication
structure for a given economy. He might thus wish to specify the structure with a
certain variability." They also suggested that the way an individual gets his~her
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information is as if he or she is making telephone calls to people chosen at random.
ln Gilles and Ruys (1988) it is argued that both argumenta are unsatiafac-
tory. Alternatively, they defend the application of a given deterministic graph for
describing a communication structure. The seminal paper of Kalai et al. (1978) on
the application of a determiniatic graph, addresses the problem of middlemen in a
three-person game. In this epecific situation they etudied the core and concluded
that a middleman, i.c. an agent which handlea all communication in the economy,
may have a disadvantageous position. In fact, this paper also shows that certain
agents can be more powerful than others. In this case, the notion of "power" is only
based on the position of those agents in the communication structure. Secondly,
it shows that the core can not be accepted as the proper cooperative equilibrium
concept iii such situations. The study of power arising from specific positiona in
social or communication structures has been recently undertaken by Gilles (1988).
A more general approach to the middlemen problem is presented in Muto et al.
(1987), where so called "Big Boss"-games are atudied.
In this paper we follow the lines as developed in Gilles and Ruys (1988 and
1989). There it is argued that conceptually the modelling of an economy with
limited communication has to be in the tradition of general equilibrium theory, as
developed in Debreu (1959), Grodal (1974), Hildenbrand (1974), and Mas-Colell
(1985). There it ie common practice to model an economy as a mapping from the
collection of agents to a certain attribute space. In Gilles and Ruya (1988) thia
practice was extended to an economy with an arbitrary communication structure.
Thus an economy consists of a socially etructured class of economic agenta, a well
chosen attribute space, and a mapping from the set of agents into the attribute
space, descríbing typee of agents. The attention in thia theory is now focusaed
on the structure of the attribute set, as induced by the mapping and the social
structure of the set of agents. We call the structured attribute space, which results
from thia model, a typology of the socially structured class of economic agents. In
this sense the socially structured collection of economic agents is typified by this
typology.
Gilles and Ruys (1988) have introduced a generalized notion of middleman
in arbitrary communication patterns, which they called a network in the attribute
space. In fact a network is a minimal collection of types of agents which can handle
all communication in the communication structure. Hence in the specific situations
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which were described by Kalai et al. (1978) the middlemen form a network on their
own. Networks are not only important in solving questions as posed by Kalai et al.
(1978) on core-allocations for agents with special positions in auch communication
structures, but also in describing explicit models of coalition formation and trade
patterns. This line has been pursuit by Gilles and Ruys (1989) with networks as
the basic notion in coalition formation in arbitrary large communication etructuree,
and in Gillea (1988), where networks and patterna of networke are uaed to give a
description of a social or communication structure. In the latter a value-like power
index was baeed on the positions of agents in such networka. This approach extenda
the acope of analysis, which was developed in the seminal paper by Kalai et al.
(1978).
In the present paper we address the fundamental question under which conditiona
the existence oí such networks, or generalized middlemen, is guaranteed. This prob-
lem ia especially important in the modelling of large economiea. In such economies
the existence problem of networke is no longer trivial. In Gilles and Ruys (1988) it
was already proven that for the "normal~ cases there is no problem with respect to
existence. With "normal" case we just mean a situation ia which the set of agents
can be typified in a compact attribute space. Although it is very plauaible that
every (large) economy can be typified in such a compact apace, it ia not guaran-
teed that all non-pathological economies are covered by this exietence result. The
main reason for this disbelief is that a typification, as described above, puta some
aevere conditions on the topology on the attribute apace. It may be that in certain
cases this space ia not compact, while the economy is quite "normal". We mention
the possibility of an economy with a countably infinite number of types. Here the
attribute apace trivially is no longer compact.
The proof of a generic exiatence result, which by the above example is of
crucial importance for applicationa, turns out to be a non-trivial problem. In this
paper we show that for specially etructured atlribute spaces the existence of a
network is guaranteed. For the moet general case we can however only prove that
there exist network-like collectío~hs of types in the typification of a communication
structure. In some sense it is dissapointing that the exiatence of a network is not
guaranteed for every situation, but on the other hand we have eatabliahed that
in every interesting case, which is not too pathological, there exiats a generalized
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middleman. This makes it plausible that in nearly every model we cnn uee the
concept of network to describe certain behaviour of economic agents.
This paper is organized as follows. In the second section we restate the model as
described in Gilleg and Ruys (1988 and 1989). The third section is devoted to the
definition of the notion oí a network and the formulation of eome existence results.
As mentioned above these results are restricted to epecific eituations. In eection 4,
a generic exisleace result is stated and proved for a network-like concept. Fiaally,
we make some concluding remarka and suggestions for future research in section 5.
2 Relational Models
In this section we will develop the model which will be analysed in the next sections
of this paper. For a full exposition of the model and its economic features we mainly
refer to the basic papers of Gilles and Ruys (1988 and 1989). It is not our purpoee
to deal with the economic content of this model, but we are mainly intereated in the
mathematicad property of the model under which conditioas there exists a network
or a network-like concept. These networks play an important role in the process of
coalition formation as described in Gilles and Ruys (1989).
The main line of our modelling will be explained in the next definitioas.
The first definition deals with the first primitive notion of our modelling, namely a
population, which describes a set of agents with individual as well as social charac-
teristica or features. These social characteristics are described by a relation on the
set of agents. Hence we are dealing with a graph as the main baeic coacept of our
model.
DeAnition 2.1 A pair (A, R) ia a population if
~ A ia a set of economic agenta ;
. R e A x A ia a aymmetric and reJ~ezive relation on the eet of agente A.
It is clear that a population - or relational atructure - can be identified with an
undirected graph. In this paper we will assume that this graph can be as well finite
as infinite, especially uncountable. In the uncountable case it is especially inter-
esting to have a model of coalition formation and arrive at a coalitional etructure
as described in Gilles (1987). However, to describe such a uncountable population
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we have to impoae some more mathematical structure. Therefore we embed the
population into a topological space of agents' characteriatics or attributes such that
it satiafies certain conditions and properties, which describe some social phenomena
as can be notified or described in the population itself.
Hence, we introduce an additional primitive concept to our model: a topo-
logical attribute space (C,r) which satisfies the Tl-separation property, i.e., for
every two pointa x, y E C, such that x~ y, there exists an open set V E r such
that (x E V and y~ V) or (y E V and x~ V). Note that we do not exclude metric
or Hausdorff spaces with this definition, but that we take the topological space as
general as possible. The space (C,r) is usually denoted as the space of character-
iatica or attrióutea. (See for instance Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1987) and
Gilles and Ruys (1988).) For some theorems in the sequel we have to impoae some
more severe conditions on the topological space (C, r) or on a subspace of it.
The next definition describes the process of embedding or modelling a popu-
lation (A, R) in the attribute space (C, r) in more detail. The purpose of this kind
oí modelling is that we are able to describe and analyse certain properties in the
setting of a population in more detail. The assumption that such an embedding or
model of a population in the topological attribute space (C, r) exists, is one of the
main postulates oí economics.
This can be illustrated by refering to the practice in general equílibrium
theory. In the work of Aumann (1964), Hildenbrand (1974) and Mas-Colell (1985)
one defines an economy as a mapping from the set or space of agents, denoted by
A, to the space of preferences, which is usually denoted by P x E~, where Et is
the f-dimensional Euclidean space. Here t' expresses the number of commodities
in the economy, and so E~ is the commodity apace. Hence, an economy is defined
as a mapping ï: A--~ P x E~. In fact the economist does not deal with the
agents themselves, but with the typology oi those agents in the type-space P x E~.
A generaliZation oí this practice in general equilihrium theory and many other
research areas in economics and other social sciences is given in the next definition.
DeBnition 2.2 Let (A,R) 6e a popu(ation.
The pair ( A, ii) ia a t,ypology of (.iQ,Ti.) in fh~ f~~~~r~ln~i~ nl ..pnrr f('. r 1 i~ Ihr r~ rri.ala
a mappíng g:.A -~ C which aatiafics th~ f:~l1,.,, ,~.,1 ,,,,~p~ rttra:
]. ,4 :- g(A) L C and
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R:- {(a, b) ~ 3(o,Q) E R: a- g(a) , 6- g(,l3)} C A x A.
t. For every point a E A there eziata an open neighbourhood Ua E r auch that
6EU,nA~(a,b)ER
.Y. For every point a E A and every pair of agenta a„0 E g'1(a) there eziata a
finite eequence ry~,...,ryn E g-~(a), where n ia a natumi number, auch tha!
~ a-ryi;
~ Q - ~Ín i
~(7„7it1) E R for every j - 1,...,n - 1.
.(. There exiata an at moat countable aequence {Cn)nEN of pairraiae diajoint topo-
logically connected aubaeta of the reatricted topological apace (A,r~A) auch that
A - unEN Cn. (Bere the collection of all poaitive integera ia denoted 6y N.~
The pointa in the aet A, which ia by definition a aubaet of the topological attribute
apace (C, r), are called types. The mapping g from the populatíon (.A, R) to the
reatricted topologica! apace (A,r~A) ia referred to aa the characterization of the
population in that topological apace.
We note from the definition that a type is an image of a certain collection of agenta
with the same chatacteristics or attributes, as described in the introduction on
the purpose of our modelling, and evenly important that those agents are socially
closely related in the sense that they are able to communicate with each other
through one another. It ia quite normal to speak of types in such situations. As the
standard theory of general equilibrium shows, one is really only interested in typee
of agenta instead of the agents themselves. (See also Hildenbrand (1974), Grodal
(1974), and Mas-Colell (1985).)
From mathematics we learn from the last property on the characterization of
a population in the topological space, that the restricted topological space (A,r~A)
conaista of at most countably many componenta. (A component of a topological
space is defined as a maximal topologically connected subset of that topological
space.) In the case of a typology of some population (A,R) in a fixed topological
space (C,r) we refer to the at most countable sequence of componenta of the re-
stricted topological space (A,r~A) as the aubdiviaion of the typology (A,R). This
subdivision will be denoted by (An)nEN.
In the sequel we assume that we have a fixed tnpological space ( C, r), which satisfies
the Tl-separation property. Moreover, we assume that we have a fixed population
which we will denote by (A, R), that can be modelled in the fixed topological epace
(C, r) by sume characterization g: A--~ C. Hence, we assume that the mapping
g satisfies the properties as formulated in the previous definition. Henceforth we
speak of a typology (A,R) oi the population (A,R) in the topological space (C,r).
The assumption that there exists a characterization for the population (A, R)
in the topological space ( C, r) is called the Axiom of Descriptive Modelling. It
is one of the main methodological axioms of economic theory, aince it assumea that
we can describe the economic behaviour of the agents in the economy by deacribing
and analysing the agents by their characteristics. Again we refer to the usual prac-
tice in general equilibrium theory and econometrics, that we mostl,y handle not the
agents themselves, but types of agents. Hence, we mostly deal with certain aspects
of the behaviour of the agents only.
In the next definitions we will describe some socia] phenomena in the setting
of a typulogy (A, R) of the population (A,R.) in the t~pological space (C.,r), which
can also be extended easily to the general setting of the population ( A, R) itself.
For details we refer to Gilles and Ruys ( 1988).
Deflnition 2.3 Let (A,R) be a typology.
The mapping F: A--~ 2A, which denotea to every type a E A the aet
F(a) :- {6 E A ~(a, b) E R}
ia the type-relation mapping of the typology (A, R). For every type a E A, the
set F(a) ia deacribing the collection of related types of a in the typology (A, R).
The next "connectedness" property on a typology turns out to be crucial in nearly
all results in this paper as well as in Gilles and Ruys (1988). Before we are able to
state this important definition, we have to define a technical tool first.
Deflnition 2.4 Let (.9, R) 6e a typology and !P1 ih~ .crqnence (.~1„ )„GN 6F ife unàquely
defined aubdiviaion.
A pair ( A, R) ia a condensation of Ihr 1pl~~~l,~.r~~ ~~ l: i,n thr r,~atrr~l~d fornL,qr~~1
apace (A,r~A) if A L .1, R ~ A~..4 and thcr~ ~,vsl.~ n surjectire nruppin.g C:.-1 -
A auch that the following propertiea are aatisficd:
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1. Forevery integer n E N and any two typea a, b E A„ it holda that C(a) - C(b).
t. For any two integera n,m E N, n~ m, and all typea a E A„ and 6 E A,,, it
holda that C(a) ~ C(b).
9. (a,6) E R if and only if there exiat inteyera n,m E N, n~ m, and two
typea x E A„ and y E Am auch that C(x) - a, C(y) - 6, and furihermore
(x,y) E R.
It is not difficnlt to see that there always exists a condensation of a typology (A, R)
in the restricted topological space (A,r~A). With the use of the notion of conden-
sation we are now able to define the main property of a typology with respect to
the social characteristics of the agents in the population.
Deflnition 2.5 A typology (A,R) ia component-connected if there exieta a con-
denaation (A, R) of (A, R) in the reatricted topological apace (A,r~A), which ia a
finitely connected graph, i.e., for every two pointa á,b E A there exiata an integer
n E N and a finite aequence cl, ..., c„ E A auch that
~ ci-á;
~ c„-6;
~ for every j- 1, ..., n- 1: (c~, c~~l ) E R.
Connectedness is a quite natural condition on relational models. It just prescribes
that there exist communication lines between all groups of types which are socially
close to each other. (In Gilles and Ruys (1988) these classes or groups of types are
called macro-typea. For an economic interpretation of this concept we also refer to
that paper.) To show the importance of the notion of component-connectedness we
state one of the main results of Gilles and Ruys (1988).
Deflnition 2.8 Let S 6e aame aet. Moreover, let G, H C S 6e two aubaeta of S,
and let n E N be an integer.
A finite aequence of aubaeta of S of length n, denoted 6y G~, . .., G„ C S, ia an
irreducible chain óetween G and H if it aatiafiea the following propertiea:
~ G1-CandG„-H;
~ for every j- 1, ..., n -- 1: G~ ~l G~~~ ~ 0;
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. forall lh-jI11: Gh(1G;-0.
The next lemma gives a full description of component-connectedness in terms of
communication within the original population and in the typology itself. The proof
of this leinma can be Cound in Gilles and Ruys (1988).
Lemma 2.? Let (A, R) be a typology of the population (A, R) in the topological
apace (C,r). Then the following atatemente are equivalent:
l. (A,R) ia component-connected.
t. For every two typea a, b E A there exiata an integer n E N and a finite
sequence of typea cl, ..., cn E A auch that the aeta F(cl), ..., F(c„) C A form
an irreduc.ióle chain óetween F(a) and F(b).
.Y. Forevery two typea a, b E A there exiate an integer n E N and a finite aequence
of typea cl, ..., c„ E A auch that cl - a, c„ - b and for every j- 1, ... n- 1:
(ci,cift) E R.
4. For every two agenta n,~3 E A there exiata an integer n E N and a finite
aequence of agenta ryl,...,ry„ E,.4 auch that yl - a, ry„ - Q and for every
j-- 1,...n- 1: (ry;,y;tl) E R, i.e., any lwo agenta in the population are able
to communicate with each other.
3 Existence of Networks
As in the previous section we again take a fixed topological space (C, r), which
satisfies the Tl-separation property, and a fixed population (A, R). Moreover, we
assume that there exists a typology (.4, R) of (A, R) in (C, r). Within the setting
of such a relational model we now define the concept of network. Although this
notion is clefined in the setting of a typology it is casily established that it can be
generalized to any graph, and hence also to the population (.A, R) itself.
We start with the definition of a so called pre-network, which expresses
the basic ideas about a specific coalition of agents, or types which can handle all
communication within the economy.
DeSnition 3.1 Let (A, R) be a typology.




The collection of aeta {F(a) ~ a E N} ia a cover of A;
Connectivity:
The graph (N, R~N), with R~N :- R fl (N x N), ia finitely connected, i.e.,
for every two typea a, b E N there ia a finite aequence of typea cr, ..., c„ E N
auch that a - cl, 6- c„ and moreover for every j- 1, ..., n- 1 it holda that
(ci,citi) f- R~N.
From the definition it is clear that any large enough set is a pre-network, since the
set of all types A itself is a pre-network. This shows that in a pre-network there may
be many "superfluous" types, i.e., we can dispose of these types without altering
the essential properties of this collection oí types. These essential properties are
just describing the handling of communication or information: Every agent in the
population can reach the network directly, and secondly, the network can deliver
the message to any other agent in the population by communicating it through
network-members only.' Hence, we are essentially interested in the minimal pre-
networks, where minimality is taken with respect to the disposal of superfluous
types. This leads to the following definition oí a network.
Definition 3.2 Let (A, R) be a typology.
A aet of typea N C A ia a network in (A, R) if it ia a pre-network in (A, R) and
there ia no type a E N auch that the aubeet N`{a} ia alao a pre-network in (A, R).
A simple version of an existence theorem for a specific typology was given and
proved in Gilles and Ruys (1988). The next lemma recapitulates this result.
Lemma 3.3 (Gilles-Ruys) Let (A,R) be a typology.
(a) If there exiata a pre-network in the typology,(A, R), then the typology (A, R) ia
component-connected.
(b) If the reatricted topological apace (A,r~A) ia a compact topological apace, then
there exiata a finite network in (A,R) if and only if (A,R) ia component-
connecled.
r We remark that the relations as described in the population can also be trade nlatione. This
implies thnt a network can be interpreted as a potentia7 trade device or orgeniaation.
11
For the proof of this lemma we refer to the proofof theorem 3.8(a) in Gilles and Ruys
(1988). There the properties of a pre-network, i.e., reachability and connectivity,
are the only ones, which are used in the prooí of that assertion. So the proof can
therefore be copied without major alterations, and can be applied to the case as
described in (a). For a proof of (b) we refer to the second part of the proof of
theorem 3.8 in Gilles and Ruys (1988).
We now state some properties of networks in relation with pre-networks. We also
can show that the minimality property of a network is equivalent to the minimality
of a pre-network with respect to set-theoretic inclusion.
Theorem 3.4 Let (A, R) be a typology.
(a) If the claaa of typea N C A ia a pre-network, then any collection M C A, with
the property that N C M, ia alao a pre-network.
(b) A claaa of typea N C A ie a network if and only if it ia a pre-network and
there ia no pwper auóaet of N, aay M C N with M~ N, which ia aleo a
pre-nelwork.
YROOF
Let (A, R) be a typology.
(a) Let the subset N C A be a pre-network, and suppose that M C A with
N C M. Now if M`N - 0, then the assertion is obvious. Hence asaume that
M `N ~ 0.
Since N C M it is evident that A- F(N) C F(M) and so the reachability
property of a pre-network is also satisfied by M.
To prove the connectivity property of a pre-network, we note that for every
a E ll1`N there is a type b E N such that a E F(b). (This follows directly
from the fact that N is a pre-network.) Hence we arrive at the conclusion
that a E M`N can have a chain as defined in the definition of a pre-network.
So the connectivity of M is proven.
This concludes the proof that M is also a pre-network.
(b) The if-part of the assertion is evident. Therefore we only have to check the
only if-part.
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Suppose that N C A is a network and suppose that there exists a pre-network
M C N with 1~f ~ N. Then by definition we know that ~N`M ~ 2. Now
take a fixed type a E N`M. Thus by assertion (e) and the fact that the
pre-network M C N`{a} C N, we know that N`{a} is also a pre-network.
Hence, by definition N cannot be a network. This is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
The next rnodifications of the component-connectedness property of a typology
or relational model are neceseary to state an extension of the existence tesult on
compact relational models, i.e., the case in which the restricted topological space
(A,r~A) is a compact space.
Deflnition 3.5 The lypology (A, R) ia strongly connected if there eziata a con-
denaation (À, R) of (A, R) in the reatricted topological apace (A, r~A) which ia a
finitely connected graph, and for all á E A it holda that
~{b E À ~(á, b) E R} G oo.
Anuther forrnulation of strong connectedness is that for the typology (A,R) there
exists a condensation (A, R) such that it is not only a finitely connected graph, but
that furthermore for every á E A it holds that
~(Rn ({á} x Á)] G oo.
From this property of a typology we can derive an important preliminary result,
which seems less relevant from an economic theoretic point of view, but which is of
great importance to the proof of any extension of the existence result on networks
as formulated in Lemma 3.3 for the "normal" situation of a compact typology.
Lemma 3.8 (Reordering-lemma) Let (A,R) be a atmngly connected relational
model and let (A, R) 6e a condenaation aa given in Definition 3.5. Furthermore, let
C: A -i A 6e lhe mapying belonging to thia condenaation.
Now we can reorder the aet A-{a„ ~ n E N} auch that
1. for any k E N the relational aub-model (~Jn,-1 C-'(a,,,), R~ ~Jn,-1 C-'(a,,,) ) ia
a component connected typology, and
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t. the act A can be divided into a countaóle acquence of (finite~ groupa ( B;);EN,
i.e., ~J;o1 B; - À, auch that
B, - {al},
B~ - {azi . . . , a,,, } for nl ~ 1,
B, - {a,,,-, , . . . , a,,, } for nr 1 n,-1 (r ~ 2)
where n, (r E N) are finite integera.
Moreover, if ~rl - rz~ - 1, then there eziat ak, E Br, and ak, E B,.~ auch that
(ak„ ak, ) E R.
And if ~r, -- rZ~ ~ 1, then for every ak, E B„ and ak~ E B,.~ it holda lhat
( ak~ , ak, ) ~ R.
PROOF
The proof of this lemma can easily be derived from the definition of strongly
connectedness. Take for instance any al E À. Next define Bl :- {al} and
BZ :- {a E À`Bl ~(a,a~) E R}. Moreover, let B,-1, with r 1 2, be conatructed,
then we choose
.-i
Br :- {a E À` U Bk ~ (a,b) E R, b E Br-1}.
k-1
We remark however that the reordering of À is not unique. Moreover the sequence
of groups (B;);EN may neither be unique.
Q.E.D.
Finally we are able to state the extension of the existence result on compact typolo-
gies of populations. In the proof of the theorem we explicitly use the reordering
lemma 3.6.
Theorem 3.7 Let (A,R) be a typology, and let (A„)„EN be the unique aubdiviaion
of (A, R). Let the following propertiea be aatiafied:
1. The restricted topologicn( apace (A,r~A) ia a Hauadorff apace ;
t. (A, R) ia atrongly connected ;
9. For every integer n E N, A„ ia a compact auóaet of the reatricted topologicai
apace (A,r~A) ;
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~. There exiate a reordering of the aubdiviaion, denoted by (Ak)kEN, a partition
of the reordered condenaation aa conalructed in Lemma 9.6, denoted by the
aequence (Bi)iEN (UBi - A), and an integer N E N, euch that when j~ N,
there ia a unique type ái E C-1(Bi) auch that
F(di) n C-1(Bifi) ~ 0
Then there exiata a countable network in (A, R).
PROOF
Let (Ak)kFN and (Bi)iEN be as given in cundition 4 of the theorem and the re-
ordering lemma 3.6. Moreover we denote for every integer k~ N the unique type
ák E C-1(Bk) such that -
F(ak) n C 1(Bkti) ~ 0
Note that írom lemma 3.6 it follows that for a fixed k E N it holds that for all
types a E C-'(Bk) and integers m E N with ~k - m~ ~ 1: F(a) fl C-1(B,,,) - 0.
We now take a fixed number k E N.
We define the collection, denoted by Sk C 2A, as the class of all finite pre-networks
H in the sub-model (~J~-1 C-1(Bi), R~ ~J~-1 C-'(Bi)) such that ák E E. Note that
this collection is not empty, i.e., Sk ~ 0. (This is deduced from an application of
Lemma 3.3 to the compact typology as described above.) Moreover, it is evidently
clear, that the collection Sk has a minimal element. We denote this minimal element
by Ek. We remark that Ek E Sk, and hence is a pre-network such that ák E Ek,
but that Ek is not necessarily a network.
From the sequence (Ek)kEN we now construct another sequence, denoted by (Ek)wEN,
consisting of networks, i.e., for every k E N the collection Ek is a network in the
sub-model (U~-t C-1(Bi), R~ U~-i C-~(Bi))-
For construction of the sequence we take a fixed integer k E N, and we note that
we have two posaibilities:
1. Ek is a network in (~J~-, C '(Bi), R~ ~J~ -~ C '(Bi)). Then we take Ek - Ek.
2. If Ek is not a network of (~J~-1 C-'(Bi), R~ ~Jj-1 C-'(Bi)), then by construc-
tion of Ek and property 4 of the theorem it follows that Ek ` {dk} is a network
in (~J~-~ C-1(Bi),R~ ~J~-~ C 1( Bi)). Hence we take E~ :- Ek `{ák}.
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Now for every k 7 N it holds that Ek C Ekt,.
In fact, since Ektl is a pre-network, it holds by assumption 4 of the theorem that
àk E Ekt~. But it also holds that Ek `{àk} C Ek~~, since there is no direct relation
between any type in Ek `{àk} and any type in Ektl `Ek, i.e., Rfl (Ek `{àw} x Ewt~ `
Ek) - 0. From these properties it easily follows that by construction the assertion
as formulated above is true.
Hence the sequence (Ek)~EN is increasing with respect to inclusion, and so we can
define the following set:
E' :- Li(Ek) - Ls(Ek)
By the obvious theorems it is easily established that E' is the closed limit of the
acquence (Ek)kEN. (For an elaboration oí this remark we refer to Klein-Thompson
(1984) and the introduction in Hildenbrand (1974). There is also given the defi-
nitions of the operators "Li" and "Ls" in connection with the topology of closed
convergence on a hyper-space oí closed subsets of a certain topological space.)
It is now easily proved that the collection E' is in fact a countable network in the
typology (A, R):
Countability E' is an at most countable subset of A, since for every k E N the
collection Ek is finite.
Reachability F(E') - A.
Suppose that this is not true. Then there exists a type a E A such that a~
F(E'). But there also exists a number K 1 IV, such that a E C-1(~JK 1 B~) -
UK 1 C-1(B~), and hence a E F(EK) C F(E'). This is a contradiction.
Connectivity The relational sub-model (E',R~E') is finitely connected.
Take any pair of types a, 6 E E', then there exists a number K 1 N such that
a,b E Ej~. By construction of the sequence ( Ek)kEN it holds that a and b are
finitely connected within EK, and hence are finitely connected within E~ for
every j 1 K~ N. Therefore a and b are finitely connected within E'.
Minimality Suppose there exists a type a E E' such that the collection E' `{a} also
satisfies reachability and connectivity, i.e., it is also a pre-network in (A, R).
Now there e~cists an integer j E N such that a E B„ with a~ àl if
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j? N. Then it is easy to show that for K :- max{j,N} it holds that
Ex can not be a minimal element in the collection Sk, consisting of pre-
networks in (~JK 1 C-1(B~), R~ ~JK 1 C-1(B~)) containing the unique element
hx E C-1(Bx). This is in contradiction with the assumption on Ex, and
hence with the assumptions on E'.
This concludes the proof of the assertion as formulated in the theorem.
Q.E.D.
The specific structure of the typologies for which this e~ciatence theorem is valid,
is a tree-like structure. This also shows that the existence theorem for countable
networks is only valid for certain specific situations, and cannot be called "generic".
4 Existence of Quasi-networks
As noted in the previous section we only derived some existence results on networks
under quite restrictive conditions, such as strong connectedneas and compactness.
In this section we introduce some related concepts to the notion of network in a
typology, and show that under much more general conditions the existence of such
constructions is guaranteed. We start our investigation with the introduction of
the concept of paeudo-network.
Deflnition 4.1 Le! (A, R) 6e a typology.
(a) A aet of typea N C A ia a closed pre-network in (A, R) if N ia a pre-network
in (A, R) and furthermore N ie a cloaed aet in the reatricted topological apace
(A~rIA)-
(b) A aet of typea N C A ia a pseudo-network in (A,R) if N ia a cloaed pre-
network in (A,R) and there ia no proper cloaed auóaet of N in the reatricted
topological apace (A,r~A), which ia alao a cloaed pre-network in (A,R).
From the definition above we immediately arrive at the following properties of the
concepts defined:
i. Any closed pre-network is a pre-network.
ii. The closure of any pre-network is a closed pre-network.
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iii. Since the topological space (C,r) satisfies the T7-separation property, it is
easily established that any finite pre-network is a closed pre-network.
iv. Any closed network in (A, R) is also a pseudo-network.
v. The closure of any network in the typology (A, R) is not necesearily a pseudo-
network. (The proof of this statement is fairly trivial, and rests on the insight
that there can exist closed subsets of a closure of a set S, denoted by S, which
do not have to be subsets of S itself.)
We are now able to state a corollary, which directly follows from the proofs of the
two existence results, Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.7.
Corollary 4.2 Let (A,R) be a typology.
If (A, R) aatiafiea either the condítiona aa formulated in Lemma 3.3 or the conditiona
aa formulated in Theorem 9.7, then there exiata a collection of typea N C A which
ia a network aa well aa a peeudo-network in (A, R).
PROOF
If the conditions of Lemma 3.3 are satisfied, then it follows from the fact that any
finite set is closed in a compact Tl-space, that the network as constructed in the
proof oí Lemma 3.3 is a closed set in restricted topological space (A,r~A). Hence
by iv. above this collection is also a pseudo-network in (A,R).
Let the conditions of Theorem 3.7 be satisfied.
It is easily deducted from the proof of 3.7, that the collection E` is a closed subset
in restricted topulugical space (A,r~A), and hence it is a closed network in (A,R).
Again by applying iv. it is obvious that E' also has to be a pseudo-network.
Q.E.D.
The next example shows however that we cannot generalize any of the statements
as formulated in i. - iii. above to the similar statements on the relation between
networks and pseudo-networks.
Example 4.3 Networks and pseudo-networks
In this example we construct a relational model from a not explicitly defined popu-
lation (A, R) in the two dimensional Euclidean space, denoted by E~. We construct
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this exauiEile such that there exists a network in the typology which is not a pseudo-
network, and such that there exiats a pseudo-network in the typology, which is not
a network.
First we construct the relational model, which in fact is also the population
itself, by defining the set of agents A and a relation R on that set. This is done
in the context of the non-negative orthant of the two dimensional Euclidean space,
denoted by Et . Hence we define:
A:- [(0,1] x [0, oo)] U{(0, 0)} C Et
N:-[0,1]x{0}CA
Let r be the relative ( Euclidean) topology on the set A C E~ and note that N is a
closed subset of A endowed with this topology r.
We define the relation R C A x A by giving the relation mapping F: A--~ 2A.
Take a fixed small positive number 6~ 0. Now for all types a E A we denote
by ~i(a) :- B6(a) fl A, where B6(a) is the ball with radius b around a E A, a
b-neíghbourhood in the relative Euclidean topology on A. We define the relation
mapping F as follows:
F((0, 0)) :- ,0((0, 0)) U N
F((a, 0)) :- ,Q((a, 0)) U N U ({a} x[0, oo)], for every a E(0,1]
F((a,b)) :- (i((a,b)) U {(a,0)}, for (a,b) E A`N.
Now we can draw some conclusions with respect to the constructed relational model.
First we note that (A, R) is indeed a typology of itself as a population in the
Euclidean space E'.
IL is easily established that N is a closed pre-network in (A, R). Moreover
there is no proper closed subset of N which satisfies the conditions of reachability
and connectivity of a pre-network, and hence we conclude that N is a minimal
closed pre-network, i.e., N is a paeudo-network in (A, R).
19
Next we observe that the set N' :- N`{(0, 0)} is a network in (A, R). Firstly
it satisfies both conditions of a pre-network, and secondly if we delete a point from
N', theu the remaining set dues not satisfy buth conditions. Hence N' satisfies all
conditions of a network.
So we actually constructed a typology in which there exists a pseudo-network
which containa, as a proper subset, a network.
We may conclude from the ezample above that an ezistence result on pseudo-
networks may be as hard to get as a generalisation of our initial result of Gilles and
Ruys (1988). Therefore we have to introduce a weaker concept than the concept of
pseudo-network, in order to be able to establish a more general existence result.
Both concepts introduced in the next definition are direct generalisations
uf the nutions of closed pre-network and pseudo-network as defined above. The
notion of aaymptotic cloaed pre-network is closely related to the notion of closed
pre-network. Similarly the concept of quaai-network - or minimal asymptotic closed
pre-network - is defined in the same fashion as pseudo-network in the setting of
closed pre-networks.
Before we define both new concepts we have to mention some technical
preliminaries. Let (A, R) be a typology and now define
,F(A) :- {F C A ~ F is a closed subset of (A,r~A)}
Next define T~ to be the topology of closed convergence on the class .F(A) of all
closed subsets of the restricted topological space (A, r~A). Hence the pair (.F(A),T )
is the hyper-topological space of the restricted topological space (A,r~A) endowed
with the topology of closed convergence. ( For a ful] ezposition of this hyper-space
we refer to Hildenbrand (1974). As shown there, hyper-spaces endowed with the
topology of closed convergence have many applications in economic theory, espe-
cially in general equilibrium theory.)
Deflnition 4.4 Let (A, R) 6e a typology and let (.F(A),T ) be the hyper-epace of
cloaed convergence on the reatricted topologica! apace (A,r~A).
(a) The collection of typea M C A ia an asymptotic closed pre-network in
(A, R) if M ia a cloaed aet, i.e., lbi E.F(A), and for every T~-neighbourhood
Viy of M, there exiata a cloaed pre-network N auch that N E V~y.
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(b) The collection of typea N C A ia a quasi-network in (A, R) if N ia an
aaymptotic cloaed pre-network and there ia no proper auóeet M C N, with
M ~ N, which ia alao an aaymptotic cloaed pre-network of (A,R).
Next wr come to the main existence theorern on quasi-networks. It is not only
very general, but it also gives a description of the strength of the component-
connectedness condition on a typology.
Theorem 4.b (Existence of Quasi-networks)
Let (A,R) 6e a typology auch that the reatricted topological apace (A,r~A) ia a locally
compnct Hauador„~ apace. If (A, R) ia component-connected, then there exiata a
quaai-network in (A, R).
1' ituu r
Take a fixed type d E A. Next define
Sd :- { N C' A ~ d E N and N is an asymptotic closed pre-network in (A, R)}
We note that by the component-connectedness of (A, R) the set of all types A is a
(closed) pre-network and so A E Sd ~ 0.
In order to use Zorn's lemma on the class Sd, we now take a totally ordered sub-
collection Bd C Sd. Since for every asymptotic closed pre-network N E Bd, by
definition d E N it is obvious that
dENo:-nBd~O.
We now will prove that the set No is an underbound for the totally ordered subcol-
lection Bd C Sd, i.e., we will prove that No E Sd. ( In order to do so, we note that
we only have to check whether No is an asymptotic closed pre-network in (A, R).)
In fact we know that the collection Bd is a decreasing net with respect to inclusion,
and so No :- Li(Bd) - Ls(Bd). So by theorem 4.5.4 of Klein-Thompson ( 1984), we
establish that No - limNEn, N in the topology oí closed convergence 7~ on the class
of closed sets .F(A).
We note that any T~-open neighbourhood can be written as the collection
L!(K,C~):- {FE.F(A) ~ FnK-Oand FnG~O, GEG},
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where K C A is a compact aubset oí the restricted topological space (A,r~A)
and G C r~A is some finite collection of non-empty open subsets of the restricted
topological space (A,r~A).
Hence, for each T -open neighbourhood U(K, ~) oí No, there is an asymptotic closed
pre-network Nl E Bd such that Nl E U(K,G). But U(K,C~) is then also a T~-open
neighbourhood of Nl, and hence by the definition of an asymptotic closed pre-
network, there exiats a closed pre-network, denoted by N, such that N E U(K,C'j) .
So we conclude that for every T~-open neighbourhood U(K,[J) of No, there is a
closed pre-network N E Bd such that N E U(K,G). With the use of the definition
of an asymptotic closed pre-network, we establish that No is also an asymptotic
closed pre-network in (A, R), i.e., No E Sd.
Next we apply 'Lorn's lemma on the collection Sd to establish the existence of a
minimal element, say N, in Se. (Note that d E N.)
Next we define the following collections:
S:- {N C A ~ N is a closed pre-network in (A, R)}
S' :- {N C A ~ N is an asymptotic closed pre-network in (A, R)}
(~bviously S C S'. In order to complete the proof of the theorem we first have to
prove the following claim:
CLAIM
There is no asymptotic closed pre-network N E S' such that N C N`{d}, N~
1V `{d}.
PROOF OF THE CLAIM
Suppose that there is an asymptotic closed pre-network N E S' such that N C
N`{d}, 1V ~ N`{d}. Then N U{d} C N and N U{d} ~ 1V.
First we note that N U{d} is a closed subset in the restricted topological space
(A,r~A). ( Use the Ti-separation property of (C,r).) Nezt take a 7-open neigh-
bourhood U(K, C~ ) oí ]V U{d}, where K C A is a compact set, and G -{Gl, ..., Gk}
is a finite collection of open subsets of the restricted topological space (A, r~A). We
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now prnve that there exista a closed pre-network in this 7-open neighbourhood
Ll(K,~) uf N U{d}. First define
r'.--{Gty~d~G}CG
I[ G' ~ fD, then Lf(K,G') is a neighbourhood of N~. Since N E S' we know that there
is a closed pre-network N E S such that N E Z!(K,G').
If ~' - 0, then l.l(K,{A}) is a~neighbourhood of N. By the same reaeoning as
above, there exists a closed pre-network N E S such that N E Lf(K, {A}).
In both cases above it is obvious that N U{d} belongs to S, i.e., ia a closed pre-
network, and moreover (N ll {d}) E Lf(K,C~).
Hence we may conclude that N U{d} is an asymptotic closed pre-network, and thus
IV U{d} E Sd. This contradicts the minimality assumption on N in the collection
sd.
THIS COMPLETES THE PROOF OF THE CLAIM.
We can distinguish two cases:
(i) N`{d} is an asymptotic closed pre-network, i.e., N`{d} E S'.
Then by the claim, the set N`{d} has to be a minimal element of the collection
S', and so N`{d} is the required quasi-network in (A,R).
(ii) N`{d} is not an asymptotic closed pre-network, i.e., N`{d} ~ S'.
Then by applying the claim we arrive at the conclusion that N ia a minimal
element in S', and so it is the required quasi-network in (A, R).
Q.E.D.
The theorem above is in direct sense not so interesting with respect to economic
theory, and the theory of coalition formation in populations. However, thia result
not ~nly gives a ver,y powerfull (indirect) description of the notion of component-
connectedness, but it is also of crucial importance to a general application of net-
works in economic theory. With cespect to our first remark on this reault we
note that it just states that in very general situations the condition of component-
connectedness involves the existence of a network-like structure in the population.
This means that in most economies, even in pathological ones, such structurea exiat.
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And this is of crucial importance to the application of networks and network-like
concepts in economic theory and the modelling of economies with limited commu-
nication.
To complete this description of existence results we finally state under which
conditions a countable quasi-network exists. This final theorem is a generalisation
of a similar theorem on the existence of a countable network in the previoua section.
To establish the existence of such a countable quasi-network, we only have to deal
with strongly connected typologies. Hence, we can drop some of the additional
conditions of the existence theorem on countable networka in the previous section.
Theorem 4.8 Let (A, R) 6e a typology, and !et ( An)nEN be ita uniquely defined
aubdiviaion. Aaaume that the following propertiea are aatiafied:
1. (A,R) ia atrongly connected ;
t. the reatricted topological apace (A,r~A) ia a Hauadorff-apace ;
3. for every integer n E N, A„ ia a compact aubaet of the reatricted topological
apace (A,T~A).
Then there eziata a countable quaai-network in (A, R).
PROOF
First we note that under the assumptions above the restricted topological space
(A,r~A) is a locally compact topological space. Using the reordering-lemma we can
reorder tbe sequence (A„)„EN such that for every k E N:
k k
( U A,n, R~ U A,,,) is component-connected.
m-1 m-1
Next define for every n E N the set N„ as a finite network in (An,R~An), and
construct the following sequence (Fn)nEN of finite subsets of A:
. F,:-N,;
. Given the set F ( n E N) we define Ft, :- Fn U Nnf, U {a,6}, where taking
a number 1 C k C n such that ( ák, á„}, ) E F{, we choose a E Ak and b E Antl
such that ( a, 6) ~ R.
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Now fur each it E N the set 1~;, is a finite, and thus clused. Ubviuusly it is a pre-
network ii~ the relatíonal sub-model ( B,,, R~B„), where B„ :- ~Jn,-1 Am. Moreover,
the sequence (F)„EN is increasing, i.e., F; C F;t, for all j E N.
Define N:- Ls(F„) - Li(F„). It is eaey to check that N ia a closed aubset of the
restricted topological space (A,r~A), which satisfies all properties of a pre-aetwork.
Hence, N is a countable cloaed pre-network.
Thia means that there exists a countable asymptotic closed pre-network in (A, R).




d E N and N is an at most countable l
asymptotic closed pre-network in (A, R) J
Hence Sd ~ 0. (Take N U{d} as an example oï an element in the collection Sd.)
Similarly as is done in the proofof the general existence theorem on quaei-networks,
wc arc abli, tu cstablish that.:
1. By Zorn's lemma there exi9ta a minimal element in the collection Sd.
2. Define:
S:- {N C A ~ N is an at most countable closed pre-network in (A, R)}
S, -( N C A I N is an at most countable 1
' Sl asymptotic closed pre-network in (A, R) 1
By repeating a course of reasoning which is similar as in the prooí of the
general existence theorem, we arrive at the conclusion that there ezists a
minimal element in the collection S'. This is the desired countable quasi-
network in (A, R).
Q.E.D.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have stated sume results un the existence of networks and network-
like concepts in the setting of relational ecunomies. The significance of theae results
is that they cover nearly all possible typifications of populations in a topological
attribute space.
zs
The main existence result is already stated in Gilles and Ruys (1988), aad
covers those economies which can be characterized in a topologically compact at-
tribute space. In the literature one mostly takes such attribute spaces since it
expresses the notion oí a large, however bounded, class of types in the economy. In
those typifications the existence of networks is no problem.
The second existence result gives an extension to more pathological typifi-
cations, namely with unbounded many types, which however can be "ordered" in a
string of compact classes. For these near-compact collections of types the ezistence
oí networks is neither a problem.
The search for a generic result led us to the definition of a network-like
concept, called a quaai-network. It turns out that the component-coanectedness
property implies the existence of such a quasi-network in the most general setting.
Since (component-) connectedness is a very natural condition on an economy, this
result expresses that generically there always exists a network-like structure ia the
economy. This is crucial in the development of new tools to descr7be economies
with relational constraints on (economic) behaviour. It also impliea that we can
use freely the concept of network to describe the process of coalition formation and
the formation of social striutures in such econoruies.
Hence the relevance of these results can alsu be illustrated by reiering to the
applications of networks and network-like concepts in the description of coalition
formation in such a setting, as is done in Gilles and Ruys (1989), and the application
to the study of communication within relational settings as is done in Gilles (1988).
The main drawback of the theoxy of networks in typifications, is that these reaults
only gitarantee the existence of such structures in the economy, but do not state
anything un the number of networks in the ecouumy. lt is likely that in any economy
there are an infinite number of such networksa. Within this number there are many
networks, which have no relevant meaning in the description of certain social or
economic phenomena, such as coalition formation.
We therefore introduced the notion of active or relevant network in Gilles
and Ruys (1989). For the moment we are not able to give a formal definition of
this notion. The relevancy of a cettain network is based on the phenomena which
~In most cases we probably even have to count with an~uncountnbly inflnite number of net~vorke
in the economy. Especially in the compact case, which is the "normnl" situntion, this is likely, ae
can be inferred írom Lemma 3.3.
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the modeller wants to describe in the model, and hence is depending on the model
itself. 1''or example in a health economy one is mostly interested in networka with
a medical as well as an economic meaning in the economy.
We admit that this reduction of the amount of networks in an economy
is still somewhat vague and informal. Therefore future research has to develop
tools to describe which networks are relevant for a certain problem and which are
not. These tools probably not only depend on the social structure and the social
constraints in the economy, as described in this paper and Gillea and Ruys (1988),
but also on the individual economic capacities of the agenta in the economy3.
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